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In the space of only a few years, Bryan Norton has become one of the essential actors of
environmental ethics through his launching of what has become one of its dominant trends:
environmental pragmatism. Environmental pragmatism refuses to take a stance in the dispute
between the defenders of anthropocentrist ethics and the supporters of nonanthropocentrist ethics.
Instead, Norton prefers to distinguish between "strong anthropocentrism" and "weak-or extended-
anthropocentrism” and develops the idea that only the latter is capable of not under-estimating the
diversity of instrumental values that humans may derive from the natural world. The practical
difference between these two kinds of theories is considerable. 
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Bryan G. Norton is currently Professor of Philosophy and
Political Science at the School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA. Born on July 19, 1944 in
Marshall (Michigan), he enrolled in several university courses
(sociology, political science and philosophy). In 1970, he
submitted a thesis on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap and
was awarded a Ph.D. Several years later, this was the subject
of his first important publication (Linguistic Frameworks and
Ontology: a Re-Examination of Carnap's Metaphilosophy). His
interest in environmental issues emerged during that same
period, through the organisation of a series of symposia and
seminars of which he was the Principal Investigator, on the
subject of Wilderness (1977), on the relationship between
Man and Nature (1978-1979) and other subjects such as the
link between ecology and environmental ethics (1980). Over
the next three years when he was teaching at the University of
Maryland as a Research Associate in the Department of
Philosophy and Public Policy (1981-83), he coordinated work
on the issue of the preservation of species and edited the
publication in 1986 of a volume bringing together the main
results of this prolonged collegial reflection. He wrote the
preface, introductions to several sections and two of its
chapters (The Preservation of Species. The Value of Biological
Diversity).
Meanwhile, he published a succession of decisive articles in
the prestigious review Environmental Ethics. They were to
have a significant impact on the history of environmental
ethics, by giving them a pragmatic turn according to a logic
which the author retrospectively reconstructs as follows:
In the first paper, ["Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman
Rights" (1982a)], I expressed doubts that environmental
concerns could be expressed in terms of "rights" because of
the systemic nature of environmental goods and the
individual nature of rights (and utilities). The second paper
["Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generation"
(1982b)], more positive in nature argued for the possibility of a
more holistic idea of what we owe the future. At that time, I
had not seriously considered an explicit appeal to
pragmatism, although I think the basic approach of both
these papers was consistent with pragmatism. But in
developing the "weak anthropocentrism" idea, [in
"Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism" (1984)] I
began to see that one could support an environmental ethic
without "extension" of human ethical concepts to
nonhumans, which meant I could offer an intelligible
alternative to non anthropocentrism. Later in the 1980s, I
began to see that, if one builds an ethic that is adequately
long-sighted and adequate to capture the long-term
advantages of protection of natural systems, then this ethic
would probably coincide in many of its policy implications with
a well-worked out nonanthropocentric theory. This led,
eventually, to my paper ["Conservation and Preservation: A
Conceptual Rehabilitation" (1986b)], published in 1986, where
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I first proposed, at the end of the article, the "convergence
hypothesis". This formulation is, in my view, the first step
toward a more "pragmatist" position, an idea that was
developed in my 1991 book [Toward Unity Among
Environmentalists]. The convergence hypothesis seems to
me to be pragmatic in the sense that it suggests that anthro
and nonanthro are "philosophical" theories that make little or
no difference to practice (Bryan Norton, Personal
communication).
In the space of only a few years, Bryan Norton has become
one of the essential actors of environmental ethics through
his launching of what has become one of its dominant trends:
environmental pragmatism.
The originality of his pragmatism in the context of
environmental ethics is perhaps best described as a refusal to
take a stance in the dispute between the defenders of
anthropocentrist ethics1 and the supporters of
nonanthropocentrist ethics2 . Norton's early philosophical
endeavours sought to challenge the practical relevance of this
entire speculative issue by raising two closely interconnected
types of argument.
The first of these puts forward the necessarily militant
component of environmental ethics in its role as an emerging
field of research. In this respect, there are only two possible
outcomes: either environmental ethicists genuinely aim to
guide policies by subjecting them to relatively rational rules,
in which case their failure to achieve this objective so far
should encourage them to consider, firstly, what it is in their
way of expressing and dealing with problems that has
prevented them from succeeding, and secondly, to adapt their
discursive strategy to the realities of politics; or else the
theorists of environmental ethics choose to pursue their
metaphysical wrangles over the status of the intrinsic value of
natural entities, over the possibility of considering
ecosystems from a moral standpoint and other issues such as
the number of angels who can dance on the head of a pin, in
which case they need to decide once and for all whether they
really care about the current ecological crisis.
According to Norton, what actually matters as regards the
environment, is not so much taking principled stances, but
rather developing rational aids to decision-making, so that
the various actors can agree on what should be done and
develop the concrete policy measures which need to be
implemented. In this sense, petty in-fighting between
anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists, humanists and
ecocentrists, "shallow" and "deep ecologists", etc., are all the
more damaging that they divide environmental ethicists and
stifle efforts for concerted and effective action.
The second argument makes the point that the discussion
between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists is
particularly futile insofar as the major concept of "human
interests" (or human utility), on which the whole discussion
focuses, is left very much undefined. The fact that satisfying
human interests does not necessarily involve the irreversible
destruction of the object of desire is insufficiently noted: there
is a distinction to be made between utility which is satisfied by
the immediate consumption of natural goods (raw materials,
agricultural products, etc.) and a utility which implies the
conservation of the useful object since conservation is a
prerequisite for satisfying human interests (this is the case for
all the ecological services provided by nature without which
we would very soon be deprived of any access to consumer
goods). More generally, far from being no more than a source
of raw materials or an open-air dumping ground for our
waste, nature can have an aesthetic, moral, spiritual or
scientific value for humans. In this case, so that the
satisfaction nature provides can endure, the object must
remain intact since satisfaction is in a way inseparable from
the object itself, to the point of being inherent to it—making it
possible, so to speak, to assign a educational, (and no longer
metaphysical) meaning to the concept of intrinsic value,
inasmuch as the objects of satisfaction are not considered to
be indefinitely and indiscriminately substitutable.
From this stems the concept of distinguishing, as Norton did
in the early 1980s, between "strong anthropocentrism" and
"weak (or extended) anthropocentrism. Only the latter is
capable of not under-estimating the diversity of instrumental
values that humans may derive from the natural world, and
correlatively not homogenising the plurality of interests or
preferences they experience (a spontaneous "feeling" of
preference is essentially different from a "considered"
preference which is mediated by a given vision of the world).
A theory is said to be strongly anthropocentrist if all the
natural values it recognises are related to the satisfaction of
preferences felt by human beings. A theory of value is said to
be weakly anthropocentrist if all the natural values which it
recognises are related to the influence exerted by a given
"felt" preference on the ideals which structure the vision of
the world (and on which are essentially based "considered"
preferences)3.
The practical difference between these two kinds of theories
is considerable. Insofar as preferences felt by humans are not
subject to any review within the value system of strong
anthropocentrism, there is no way in which can be criticised
the attitude of those for whom nature is no more than a store
of raw materials to be extracted and used in manufacturing
products to satisfy human preferences. Inversely, insofar as
weak anthropocentrism recognises that felt preferences may,
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1 In which, man, in the final analysis, is the yardstick for everything and the single end-point, with which all of nature complies, as the simple instruments of his well-being.
2 For which, independently of any human evaluation, nature includes intrinsic objectives and natural values, those pertaining to humans obviously among them, but without 
granting humans the right to any particular privilege, since they are only members—amid many—of Earth's living community.
3 It is this argumentative strategy which enables Norton to plead in favour of species preservation without having to resort to the concept of "intrinsic value", see Norton, B. (1986a,
1987).  In response to those who consider that species in danger of imminent extinction cannot be protected if they are without any commercial utility, unless the argument of
the intrinsic value of biodiversity is put forward, Norton emphasises that it is not because a species cannot prove its economic or industrial value that it has none. Norton seeks
to demonstrate that it is possible to recognise a utilitarian value to biodiversity for its own sake, without having to take into account the specific characteristics of members of
the species or of its population as a whole—a value that would therefore be situated beyond any known or demonstrable value, but would still not be an intrinsic value.  
In this way, it would be possible to dispense with a case by case value justification for each species, without having to transcend the domain of human utility.
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or may not, be rational (in the sense that they may be judged
as not being consonant with a rational vision of the world), it
provides a framework for the possible critical review of the
value systems which prescribe a relationship with nature
based on pure exploitation:
In this way, weak anthropocentrism makes available two
ethical resources of crucial importance to environmentalists.
First, to the extent that environmental ethicists can make a
case for a world view that emphasizes the close relationship
between the human species and other living species, they can
also make a case for ideals of human behavior extolling
harmony with nature. These ideals are then available as a
basis for criticizing preferences that merely exploit nature.
Second, weak anthropocentrism as here defined also places
value on human experiences that provide the basis for value
formation. Because weak anthropocentrism places value not
only on felt preferences, but also on the process of value
formation embodied in the criticism and replacement of felt
values with more rational ones, it makes possible appeals to
the value of experiences of natural objects and undisturbed
places in human value formation. To the extent that
environmentalists can show that values are formed and
informed by contact with nature, natures takes on value as a
teacher of human values. (Norton, B., 1984, p. 135)
This latter value is the one which Norton soon came to
designate by the name of "transformative value", i.e. a value
capable of transforming preferences in accord with a higher
ideal. It is remarkable that this is neither an instrumental, nor
a non-instrumental (or intrinsic) value, but rather a value
which cannot be reduced to either of these categories, which
are therefore revealed as unable to express the entire range
of values that humans can attribute to nature. Rather than be
forced into accepting this bipartite classification of natural
values, Norton suggests an acceptance of their essential
plurality and situating them in a kind of continuum, ranging
from the values of consumer society to aesthetic, spiritual and
other similar values.
In such circumstances, the environmentalist's task, when
entering the public arena, will be to defend and command the
respect— to the fullest extent possible—of the above
principles, while seeking to define an environmental policy
capable of the fullest and most harmonious integration of the
entire range of natural values. Norton's belief on this point, is
that programmes for the protection of the environment are
perfectly justifiable on the basis of a sufficiently broad
interpretation of anthropocentric instrumental values and,
better still, that this point of view has an undeniable practical
advantage, on the one hand because it is the mode of
justification which is the most current among
environmentalists and therefore constitutes an immediately
recognised forum for debate and, on the other hand, because
by neutralising the axiological controversy between intrinsic
value and human utility, it allows for individual subjectivity to
choose between the various philosophical options. As a result,
the debate is moved to the area of rational modes of
environmental action.
It is this idea that the author, after further consideration,
reworded under the name of "convergence principle",
meaning that between defenders of intrinsic value and
supporters of anthropocentrism, there is a double
convergence despite disagreement on the value principle. On
the one hand, the convergence is in practical terms (as
regards recommended measures and action strategies); and
on the other hand it is axiological (due to the possibility of
taking into consideration values ignored by strict
anthropocentrism).
As Norton points out specifically, the corollary of this principle
is the recognition of the validity of two distinct types of
methodological pluralism, one of which could be named
"theoretical pluralism" and the other "meta-theoretical
pluralism". The first of these accepts the existence of a
multiplicity of mutually incommensurable theoretical models
which can be the foundation for the moral considerability of
natural entities. The models remain theoretically different but
in practice this makes almost no difference, as for example,
the model based on the criterion of animal sentience (as in
Peter Singer) to justify animals being given moral
consideration, or the one which refers to the determination of
all organic individuality as the teleological centre of life (as in
Paul Taylor). The second type of pluralism accepts the
possibility that several divergent moral theories, which do not
even agree on the determination of environmental ethics
issues, can nevertheless work together as part of a single
moral enterprise—as happens for example when ecofeminists
and ecocentric environmentalists cooperate to save the same
natural habitat, even though their respective commitment is in
practice based on very different theoretical considerations4.
The advantage of a pluralistic approach to values is that, by its
very nature, it is prepared to seek compromise and determine
jointly, through environmental policy negotiations, the
conditions for cooperative action, thus making it possible to
form strategic causal coalitions5. The chances of finding
common ground are all the greater as environmental
pragmatism does not refer to any concept which would be
difficult to justify in philosophy, as that of "intrinsic value", nor
does it in any way suppose that one needs to adopt, before even
entering into discussion, any particular "vision of the world".
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4 For more on that subject, see Light, A. and Katz, E. (1996, p. 4 sq.).
5 For that matter, it is probably because Bryan Norton is a keen advocate of striking a reasonable balance between various opinions and divergent interests that environmental 
pragmatism, of which he is the most eloquent exponent, has so frequently been considered as one of the options in the United States when public policy environmental 
programmes were under evaluation, with Norton himself as a participant.  He was an active member of the well-known governmental Environmental Protection Agency, where 
he served from 1991 to 1994 on the Science Advisory Board and co-authored the annual Risk Assessment Forum report, from which arose the first evaluation protocols 
for Ecological Risk Assessment in the United States.  He also participated in the work of several no less well-known NGOs, in particular sitting as an elected member 
of the Governing Board of the Society for Conservation Biology (1988 to 2005) and of the Board of Directors of Defenders of Wildlife, (1996 to 2005).
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Although it does firmly denounce the attempt to reduce all
natural values to the status of economic ones, and although it
criticises the systematic use of cost-benefit analysis and
warns against the pitfalls of the contingent valuation method,
environmental pragmatism shares with decision-makers the
fundamental and firmly-held belief that solutions to
environmental problems must be found in the sustainable
development of economic systems, for the sake of our
responsibility to future generations who must be able to
benefit from the generosity and services offered by the
ecosystem: 
“In our search of an environmental ethic we will never, I submit,
find any environmental values or goals more defensible than the
sustainability principle". (Norton, B., 2003, p. 63)
Determination of the conditions for sustainable development
has been the focus of all Norton's philosophical efforts for over
a decade—efforts which culminated in the publication in 2005
of his most ambitious work to date, in which he laid the
groundwork for an adaptative ecosystem management
philosophy (Sustainability. A philosophy of Adaptative
Ecosystem Management).
In harmony with the main theoreticians of sustainability,
Norton considers that the problem of morally acceptable
conditions for sustainable development needs to be
considered in the framework of a theory for intergenerational
equity. He also considers that the differences between
currently available sustainability models are due to the way the
problem of the determination of obligations we have to future
generations is raised and the solutions to it are found.
Our obligations to future generations can be emphasised in
three different ways.
The distance problem can be our point of focus, in which case
the question is determining how far into the future our moral
obligations should extend. In this sense, it would appear that
our usual approach to environmental valuation tends to
consider all the values extant in the future as discountable
functions of current values, so that they become irremediably
rooted in the present and do not adequately consider the
interests of future people. We then need to decide whether it is
possible to develop a value theory that can determine what is
fair for both present and future generations.
Or else we can focus on the ignorance argument, the question
then being to find out who will be living in the future and what
they will be needing. To the extent that individuals in the future
cannot express their concerns and interests today and since
we are reluctant to force on them any particular version of
what is "good", it becomes difficult to even begin evaluating the
policies that might affect them. Finally, we could emphasise
the typology of effects problem, signifying that we would need
to find out which of our present actions have truly moral
implications for the future. 
Norton considers that two major sustainability models are
currently emerging. Some sustainability theoreticians
maintain (by granting some pre-eminence to the ignorance
argument) that what we owe the future is no more than the
opportunity to benefit from a certain number of utilities,
undiminished from one generation to the next. In which case,
for the supporters of that principle, intergenerational equity
should be a comparison between the possibilities of benefiting
from various forms of well-being available to individuals living
in different time frames. The aim of sustainability does not in
any way require that we leave intact any specific resource, but
rather that we try and maintain an undiminished stock of
capital in the shape of a wealth of investment, productive
capacity and technological expertise. What should be passed
on from one generation to the next is the same level of
possibilities and the same equitable scope of opportunity.
Since it is probably impossible to curb or control the type of use
that is made of the environment and the consequent
distribution of the fruits of cooperation which corresponds to
what today's people consider is good for themselves, and
since—in certain circumstances —diminished resources or a
deterioration of the quality of the environment can be the
outcome of a totally rational use of resources by previous
generations, then each succeeding generation is duty bound to
make sure that the range of life opportunities available to its
offspring is no less satisfactory than the one they enjoyed
themselves. This implies that each generation recognises that
it is morally bound to offset depleted resources or a degraded
environment by developing an equivalent production potential.
Other sustainability theoreticians recommend a different
course: instead of comparing individual forms of well-being, a
list of "features" which must be saved for the benefit of future
generations should be drawn up. "Features" means any aspect
of the natural world which is physically describable, including
important sites, groups of biological classifications, fixed
reserves of resources and important ecological processes.
Examples of such "features" would include: sufficient supplies
of safe drinking water; the Grand Canyon, grizzly bears (or
more generally, "biological diversity"); an intact ozone layer in
the upper atmosphere; and perhaps landscapes such as
mainly forested areas. By this approach (whereby only the
problem of the typology of effects is considered to be truly
important), the assumption that resources are totally fungible is
unacceptable and, on the contrary, it is important to specify the
environmental characteristics and processes which are
essential for future well-being and to state that they are so
important that any decision as to what must be passed on that
does not include them would inevitably cause future
generations to be cheated. The loss of such characteristics
should be seen as a deterioration of the quality of life for future
generations, regardless of the amounts paid by way of
compensation or the total wealth offered as a substitute to
compensate for their loss.
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Norton seeks to fit these two models together by developing a
sufficiently all-embracing theory to link the well-being of
future generations to the range of options or choices left open
to them, and which moreover could be rendered operational by
specifying physical characteristics as indicators of future well-
being. He points out that although, without a doubt, we do have
an obligation not to impoverish future generations, we may
also owe them a reasonably unrestricted range of options and
opportunities. In the circumstances, would it be absurd to say
that we might be reducing the options available to them while
we were trying to shelter them from economic
impoverishment?
Consider, for example, a very wealthy widower who, being a
well-intentioned despot (...) refuses to allow his daughters to
pursue an education, and instead places their inheritance in a
productive and secure trust, ensuring that they will have a
more-than-adequate income for life (provided they never go to
college under pain of disinheritance). In this case, which of
course differs from our sustainability cases in some perhaps
important ways, I think it could be said that, if any of the
daughters wanted to attend college, they would have been
made worse off than they would have been had their father not
forbidden them to do so. Further, it rings far truer—given that
the daughters are lavishly cared for financially—to explain the
harm done to the daughters not in terms of economic
impoverishment, but in terms of a narrowed range of options
life choices.
If that case makes sense, it is not a much further step to an
environmental case: suppose that our generation converts all
wilderness areas and natural communities into productive
mines, farmlands, production forests, or shopping centres,
and suppose that we do so efficiently and that we are careful
to save a portion of the benefits, and invest them wisely,
leaving the future far more wealthy than we are. Does it not
make sense to claim that, in doing so, we harmed future
people, not economically, but in the sense that we seriously
and irreversibly narrowed their range of choices and
experiences? A whole range of human experience would have
been obliterated; the future will have been (...) impoverished.
(Norton, B., 1999, pp. 131-32)
The thesis Norton is defending is that our obligation to the
future includes—in addition to maintaining an equitable
savings rate—maintaining an intact range of choices and
opportunities so that certain activities can be pursued and
certain interests enhanced. To elucidate, we must begin with
a careful examination of what is meant by "choice" and
"opportunity" and continue with the introduction of
conceptual models to express sustainability in terms of
keeping options open. In other words, there must be, in a
manner that makes political sense, a correlation between
options and opportunities on the one hand, and, a physically
describable systemic characteristic on the other, so that the
problem of intergenerational equity can be reduced to a
determination of the characteristics of the ecosystem and the
countryside which it is essential to preserve for the benefit of
future values considered to be of local importance.
An option designates, in Norton's terminology, a natural
resource available for the utility that humans may have for it,
while "utility" is defined as meaning not only the material
advantage they may offer, but also the aesthetic (or scientific,
etc.) enjoyment linked to the distinctive "style" of the area in
question. In this sense, options correspond to the "inventory"
of usable resources available at a given time. An opportunity—
a more complex concept with options as one of its
components—corresponds to a situation in which all the
conditions are present to enable a resource to be chosen at any
given time. One of these conditions is obviously that the option
is available at the time when the choice is to be made, but an
opportunity also requires that it is possible to act with a view to
using that option within that timeframe. For a resource which
is the object of an option to be truly an opportunity, the
resource must continue to exist unspoiled and usable at the
time the choice is made whereas, correlatively, the person who
wishes to use it must be empowered, both physically and
politically, to access that option.
Intergenerational equity therefore requires, to the fullest
extent possible, that people in the future are able to access the
options under protection. The conditions for such access are
partly political (demanding the development of open and
responsible institutions in charge of allocating resources) and
partly economic (implying that an adequate level of
wealth/income is maintained).
To conform with Norton's model, the availability of an option
is to be understood necessarily, but not sufficiently, as
conditional on the existence of an opportunity. Conversely, an
opportunity can only be protected if the option is also
protected. In consequence, deciding what the present
generation owes to future generations is to determine which
set of presently available options our generation can use
without unfairly subtracting from those which need to be left
open to provide future opportunities. 
Those aspects of the natural world which must be protected
are still to be defined. Norton suggests correlating economic
development to the natural characteristics of a region and its
key resources. According to that growth model (which he
names: "Integrated Regional Development Path"), key natural
resources are not interchangeable with other forms of capital,
but certain resources are valued as "key resources" for the
economic development of the community. The resources
become keystones in the local economy in that the
persistence of all kinds of activities in the region (such as
resource extraction, transport, tourism and manufacturing)
depends on the protection of such resources. Families, for
example, wishing to live in the region for generations, would
be well advised to valuate these keystone resources as
essential so as to keep the same range of opportunities open
for the following generation. When families living in the region
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plan the long term future of their community as an ongoing
multi-generational project, they naturally consider that
prudent use of key resources is a kind of investment that
protects the fundamental values of their community. If these
key resources are over-exploited and depleted, their loss has
a much greater impact on the economy than a mere loss of
income, because the distinctive features of the regional
environment and the diversity of the available habitats would
be impaired: 
These keystone natural resources form the basis for an
enduring and place-based cultural identity, based both on the
distinctive resource mix that greeted early settlers and on the
distinctive cultural practices and institutions that have been
built to use these resources. They are basic to any strategy of
regional development that recognizes the importance of
natural resources to the comparative advantage of the region.
The Integrated Regional Development Path, therefore,
emphasizes place-relative development, which in turn links
the economy and local residents in more and more integrated
system of economic and cultural links and institutions. These
links are place-based and intergenerational in nature.
(Norton, B., 1999, pp. 146-47) 
The Integrated Regional Development Path bases
development on core distinctive features and sources of value
specific to each region, while also seeking to protect them.
Environmental policies should try to ensure the protection of
the community's distinctive character and regional identity
and consider that one of their tasks is to promote the
development of a sense of "place" and a better understanding
of the role of a region's natural history in building up the
economy and the culture which make it different from any
other region. If that were the case, economy and ecology
could progress hand in hand, so that an intergenerational
bond would be created in the shape of a set of characteristics
that would express the opportunities that the region originally
offered to the early settlers. In this way, natural history and
cultural history would provide the framework for current
affairs to find their place and be dealt with. Furthermore,
human communities would be more attached to their region,
and their values, aspirations and identity across time would
have greater continuity.
This analysis demonstrates that sustainability can be more
generally defined as follows:
Sustainability is a relationship between generations such that
the earlier generations fulfil their individual wants and needs
so as not to destroy, or close off, important and valued options
for future generations. (Norton, B., 2005, p. 363)
A very sketchy analysis, as Norton hastens to emphasise,
needing to be refined for each local community, which will
ultimately have to decide what it wishes to pass on to future
generations. By implication, "every community might come
up with a different definition" (Norton, B., 2005, p. 40). 
For Norton, this is contextualism, because his goal is to find
local solutions to local problems. But what precisely
differentiates this form of "contextualism" from relativism? If
the localities are the principal actors in defining sustainability,
then is there any basis for external criticism? 
Moreover, what can we do if a community adopts an
unsuitable idea of sustainability and related insustainable
practices in cases where grand-scale cooperation between
local communities, either at national or international level or
both, is required? Is Norton's approach applicable to solve
problems which cannot be reduced to a local scale and that
local communities tend to neglect, or even ignore, and which
require cooperation between different communities and
beyond, between different countries on a planetary scale? 
Finally, can environmental policies afford to dispense with
universal principles? Should not fighting global warming, for
example—a subject which Norton remarkably hardly
mentions in all of the 607 pages of Sustainability—necessarily
involve the development of a global community concept6? 
REFERENCES
Light A. and E. Katz (Eds.) (1996). Environmental Pragmatism,
London & New York, Routledge.
Norton B. (1977). Linguistics Frameworks and Ontology: A
Re-Examination of Carnap’s Philosophy, La Haye, Mouton
Publishers.
Norton B. (1982a). Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman
Rights, Environ.Ethics, 4, 17–36, 1982a.
Norton B. (1982b). Environmental Ethics and the Rights of
Future Generation,Environ. Ethics, 4, 319–337,.
Norton B. (1984). Environmental Ethics andWeak
Anthropocentrism, Environ.Ethics., 6, 131–148.
Norton B. (1968a). (Ed.): The Preservation of Species. The
Value of BiologicalDiversity, Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
Norton B. (1986b). Conservation and Preservation: A
Conceptual Rehabilitation,Environ. Ethics, 8, 195–220.
Norton B. (1987). Why Preserve Natural Variety?, Princeton,
PrincetonUniversity Press.
Norton B. (1991). Toward Unity Among Environmentalists,
Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press.
Norton B. (1999). Ecology and Opportunity. Intergenerational
Equity andSustainable Options, in: Fairness and Futurity. Essays
in Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice, edited by:
Dobson, A., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 118–150.
78
6 See the excellent book review of Sustainabilty by Oksanen, M. (2007).
H.-S.AFEISSA THETRANSFORMATIVE VALUE OF ECOLOGICAL PRAGMATISM.AN INTRODUCTION TO THEWORK OF BRYAN G.NORTON
S
.
A
.
P
.
I
.
E
N
.
S
Norton B. (2003). Searching for Sustainability.
Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy of Conservation
Biology, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Norton B. (2005). Sustainability. A Philosophy of Adaptive
Ecosystem Management, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
Oksanen M. (2007). Sustainabilty: A Book Review, Environ.
Value, 16, 272–277.
Selective bibliography
Papers
Making the Land Ethic Operational: Toward an Integrated
Theory of Environmental Management, in: Beyond the Large
Farm: Ethics and Research Goals for Agriculture, edited by:
Thompson, P. B., and Stout, B. A., Boulder, Westview Press,
137–160, 1991.
Epistemology and Environmental Values, The Monist, 2, 1992,
208–226, 1992. A New Paradigm for Environmental
Management, edited by: Costanza, R., Norton, B. G., and
Haskell, B. D., Washington, Island Press, 23–40, 1992.
On What We Should Save: The Role of Culture in Determining
Conservation Targets, in: Systematics and Conservation
Evaluation, edited by: Forey, P. L., Humphries, C. J., and Vane-
Wright, R. I., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 23–40, 1994.
Where DoWe Go from Here? [with Gene Hargrove], in: Ethics
and Environmental Policy. Theory Meets Practice, edited by:
Ferré, F., and Hartel, P., Athens & London, The University of
Georgia Press, 234–252, 1994.
Applied Philosophy versus Practical Philosophy: Toward an
Environmental Policy Integrated According to Scale, edited by:
Marietta Jr., D. E. and Embree, L., Boston-London, Rowan &
Littlefield, 125–148, 1995.
Why I Am Not a Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure
of Monistic Inherentism, Environ. Ethics, 4, 341–58, 1995.
Democracy and Sense of Place Values in Environmental
Policy [with B. Hannon], in: Philosophy and Geography.
Philosophy of Place, Vol. 3, edited by: Light, A. and Smith, J.
M., Boston-London, Rowan & Littlefield, 119–145, 1998.
Pragmatism, Adaptive Management, and Sustainability,
Environ. Value., 8, 451–466, 1999.
Democracy and Environmentalism: Foundations and
Justifications in Environmental Policy, in: Democracy and the
Claims of Nature. Critical Perspectives for a New Century,
edited by: Minteer, B. A. and Taylor, B. P., Boston-London,
Rowan & Littlefield, 11–32, 2002.
Epistemology and Environmental Values, in: Land, Value,
Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy, edited
by: Ouderkirk, W. and Hill, J., New York, SUNY Press, 123–132,
2002.
Concerning Norton
Callicott JB. (1996). On Norton and the Failure of Monistic
Inherentism, Environ. Ethics, 18, 219–221.
Elliott K. (2007). Norton’s Conception of Sustainability:
Political, Not Metaphysical?, Environ. Ethics, 1, 3–22, 2007.
Hickman LA. (2007). Pragmatic Paths to Environmental
Sustainability, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental
Ethics, 20, 365–373.
Holly M. (2007). A Review of Bryan G. Norton’s Sustainability:
A Philosophy of Ecosystem Management, Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 20, 335–352.
Preston C. (1998). Epistemology and Intrinsic Value: Norton
and Callicott’s Critiques of Rolston, Environ. Ethics, 4,
409–428,.
Steverson B.K. (1995). Contextualism and Norton’s
Convergence Hypothesis, Environ. Ethics, 2, 135–150.
Saner, M.A. (2000). Biotechnology, the Limits of Norton’s
Convergence Hypothesis, and Implications for an Inclusive
Concept of Health, Ethics Environ., 5, 229–241.
Stenmark M.(2002). The Relevance of Environmental Ethical
Theories for Policy Making, Environ. Ethics, 2, 135–148,.
Thompson P.B. (2007). Norton’s Sustainability: Some
Comments on Risk and Sustainability, Journal of Agricultural
and Environmental Ethics, 20, 375–386.
Welchman J. (2007). Norton and Passmore on Valuing Nature,
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 20,
353–363.
Westra L. (1997). Why Norton’s Approach is Insufficient for
Environmental Ethics, Environ. Ethics, 3, 279–297.
79
